CONCEPT OF SELF AND EXPERIENCED
BY JESSIE

I

L.

SELF.

PREBLE.

HAVE

recently been led to the study of the concept of self be-

cause of

my

search for a fundamental startmg-point in philosophy

which should unite

in itself

two

classes of merits,

(1)

ability to

hold important place in a logical system of thought, and (2) ability
to call to the mind the concrete impressions which produced it.

The term "self" may be used in many senses. Those enumerated
by Bradley and James cover all the uses I have been accustomed to
notice until recently. And the forms of self under James's "spiritual"
and "material me"^ certainly contain all the ideational data and senseimpressions which we need to choose between and to mass together
for the formation of our full concept of self.
Bradley's analysis
breaks up this group of data and distinguishes several meanings
which can be given to the term "self." (1) It may refer to the
section of consciousness observed during any unit of time we may
choose to select.- (2) It may refer to certain aspects which most
frequently occur throughout life, and which compose what he calls
"the constant average man."^
(3) Some more isolated factor as
memory or purpose may be selected from the life stream and called

—

—

Or

the "essential self."*

(6) the self

may

be contrasted with the

and regarded as that residue which is left after "the limit
of exchange of content between self and not-self" has been reached.^
Bradley finds no difficulty in dismissing one and all of these conceptions of the self, as vague and untrustworthy because unclear
and undefined. In this he is, to a certain extent, justified because
not-self,

in things psychical

ter

it

is

probably impossible to draw a rigid line

^Principles of Psychology, Chapter
XII.
2

Appearance and Reality,

3 Ibid.,

pp. 77-78.

* Ibid., pp. 80ff.

pp. 77-78.

X; Psychology,

Briefer Course, Chap-
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of demarcation between the like and the unlike.

however,

found also

is

in the physical world.

It
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This
is

difficulty,

impossible to

measure anything with utter exactness it is impossible to place a
plane between two portions of water, one at 51° C and one at 5G° C,
which I propose to add together. Some of the 51° molecules have
;

lost heat,

some of

be made.

the 50° have gained

it,

before the addition can

Kinetic activities of the molecules cause them to

mix

with a suddenness and i^rregularity which prohibits theoretical or

This indefiniteness of outline

practical locating of cleavage lines.
is,

of course, a feature of the concept of self, no matter what

all the images composing the concept might be
made. Our question is, therefore, the following: Is it necessary
to throw over the concept of self because of its indefiniteness ? To

attempt to assemble

we may

this

reply: All mental abstraction

and generalization are

based upon substitution of a word or a sign for a thing signified.''
"Smoke" is a general term which stands for a possible visual experience.

Here we have what Taine

be written thus:

Smoke

calls

a "couple," which

(verbal percept or image)

—^Visual

may
ex-

accompanying or preceding. One term in the
couple is a word having a certain sound and a fixed usage in common
experience. At the other end of the couple is the sense-experience.
From this consideration, as it now seems to me, a refutation
may be evolved of Bradley's argument against the self-concept on
the ground of its unclearness. For suppose that when you utter the
word "self" and try to utter it in any one of Bradley's seven senses
you are unable to have a clear mental mosaic for any one of them.
Suppose that you become still further disconcerted and thrown into
perience, following,

'^

bewildering unclearness, because for his

you have a

Even

different mosaic

so, this

first

concept of self (1)

tomorrow from what you had

imaginal unclearness

is

to-day.

not decisive proof that you

did not clearly conceive the self. For no single concept is used in
any natural science which always has a setting in precisely the same
imaginal complex.
If I explain to you to-day the formula for a
complex lens, 1/u -\- l/v=l/f, I may very clearly image in my

mind's eye the deduction as given in Duff's Physics, and the proof
® Ibid., p. 91.
The numeral (6) indicates the place of this concept in
Bradley's unsystematic enumeration of seven uncoordinated and overlapping
concepts of the self. Only the more important of these are here cited.
^

On

^

It

Intelligence (translation of T. D. Haye, 1872), Chapters I-III, passim.

should be noted that the argument of this paper, though v^rritten on the
basis of a purely verbal theory of the concept, could equally well be carried through
in terms of any one of the doctrines which uphold the view that a concept is
more-than- verbal
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will

In a month,

be rapid.

at all in the interval,

if

"Duff"

I

have not thought about the proof
vanished, yet I trust that by

may have

the knowledge of certain general principles and of the nature of

wave motion
relate

it

I

shall

be able to derive this concept and to

still

We

to other concepts.

the concept l/u,

F^=mg,

s

=

z't

may

responding concrete experiences, so
self as experienced.

acters

—as

In a word,

As

experienced

therefore conclude that, as

and the Hke

a concept

self as a
it

from the

dififer

cor-

concept differs from

^stripped of certain char-

is

cannot be deprived of any characters.

it

we may apply

Taine's formula to the

self,

as to the

physical concept, and with the following result: Self, experiencer

and experienced (including not merely "personal attitudes" but also
^ Self as concept (without fixed
images and sense-impressions)

—

or clear sense-content, yet perfectly definite as to

The

self

is,

its

meaning).

accordingly, not merely one of the concepts which

can and must be discussed in philosophy it is the experienced self.
And since also the self is experiencer as well as experienced it
;

occupies the unique position (1) of experiencing unit and (2) of

constructor of concepts.

It is self

which

sees, hears, feels, thinks,

takes part in the dramatic episodes of daily

life.

And

it

is

self,

which as thinker (isolating here one factor from the whole
It seems to follow that from
just mentioned) constructs concepts.

also,

either point of view, the psychological or the logical, the self constitutes the

unavoidable starting point for philosophy.

